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MASS TORTS AND UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
VIVIAN GROSSWALD CURRAN*

1.

INTRODUCTION

The technologies of the present era mean that injuries have
become more massive in dimension. Mass torts affect greater
numbers of people and larger geographical areas. Consequently,
they can cross borders, affecting the populations of multiple
countries.1
Mass catastrophes need not involve intentional
wrongdoing, of course. The devastating 1986 accident at the
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, for example, resulted from a
design failure combined with inadequately trained personnel.
United States law has two mechanisms in tort law for
remedying mass catastrophes.
The first, applicable to
unintentional as well as intentional torts, is the class action lawsuit,
which has no functional equivalent in the civil law nations of
Continental Europe. The unintentional tort is not the subject of
this essay. The second, restricted to cases involving jus cogens
violations (namely, violations of human rights so grave as to be
against international customary law, or the "law of nations"), is
universal jurisdiction pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
Universal jurisdiction for jus cogens violations does have a
2
functional equivalent in civil law States, but not in their tort law.
Traditionally, civil law legal systems have restricted universal
jurisdiction to criminal actions. This distinction generally has been
viewed as a seminal difference between the United States and the

Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh.
For a list of countries affected by the Chernobyl disaster, see In Focus: Chernobyl, INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/ focus/chernobyl/faqs.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (discussing the impact of the
disaster on Finland, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Russia, Belarus, and other countries of the former Soviet Union).
2 Until the recent Supreme Court decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013), federal appellate courts had been applying the ATS extraterritorially since 1980. The statute, enacted in 1789 but rarely applied, was revived in 1980 in Filartigav. Pena-Irala,630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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rest of the world, a view shared both by common law and civil law
jurists. It should be noted that few countries in the world have the
common law system, as it has been 'exported' from Great Britain
only to regions that had once been part of the former British
Empire. Antonio Cassese has praised the ATS for filling the gap
for individuals where neither an international entity nor the
territorial State would have afforded a forum, 3 but expresses the
concern that the civil - as opposed to criminal - law nature of the
ATS creates "the danger for courts of [the United States] of setting
themselves up as universal judges of atrocities committed abroad,
a sort of humanitarian imperialism." 4 Similarly, in Kiobel, the
Second Circuit articulated the goal of avoiding legal imperialism as
a reason for immunizing corporations from liability under the ATS.
Such concerns were also expressed by several justices of the
5
Supreme Court at both Kiobel oral arguments.
Though ATS opponents claim that international law does not
recognize civil universal jurisdiction, international legal theory
does not pose an obstacle to a State's grant of civil jurisdiction for
extraterritorial matters. In his highly respected work, Ian Brownlie
states that "in principle [there is] no great difference between the
problems created by the assertion of civil and criminal jurisdiction
over aliens." 6 The Permanent Court of International Justice
defined national prerogatives for extraterritorial jurisdiction
7
broadly in the much-cited 1927 S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey) case.
Although the significance of the broad language in Lotus is a
matter of dispute, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has never
rejected Lotus, although the 1970 Barcelona Traction decision 8
qualified Lotus by calling to mind that limits exist and that a State

3 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 393 (2d ed. 2005) (noting the
"great significance of these US court decisions").
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
2013 WL 1628935 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013) (No. 10-1491), available at http://www. suTranpremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/10-1491rearg.pdf;
script of Oral Argument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013) (No. 10-1491), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments
/argument transcripts/10-1491 .pdf.
6 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 300 (7th ed., 2008).
7 The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
10, 146 (Sept. 7).
8 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 64, 3 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).
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has "an obligation to exercise moderation and restraint as to the
extent of the jurisdiction assumed by its courts in cases having a
foreign element, and to avoid undue encroachment on a
jurisdiction more properly appertaining to, or more appropriately
exercisable by another State." 9
The ATS itself states only that "[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations." 10 In his concurring
opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,ll Justice Breyer analyzed the
ATS's reach as the intersection of several factors when he reasoned
that "international law will sometimes . . . reflect not only
substantive agreement as to certain universally condemned
behavior but also procedural agreement that universal jurisdiction
exists to prosecute a subset of that behavior" 12 and that such
"subset includes torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and
13
war crimes."
Despite the distinctive official restriction of universal
jurisdiction to the criminal law domain in civilian nations,
universal and extraterritorial ATS civil jurisdiction is not
significantly distinctive from the criminal-law universal and
extraterritorial jurisdiction that has become part of international
customary law for jus cogens violations.
This functional
equivalence has been obscured because the identical official
categories of criminal and non-criminal law exist in both legal
orders, such that there is a natural, automatic tendency to assume
in both common law and civil law States that both systems
categorize the 'criminal' and the 'civil' in fundamentally the same
way. In fact, as discussed below, the most substantively significant
aspects of the civilian criminal trial are reproduced by the U.S. tort
trial, and vice versa. Thus, ATS universal jurisdiction would place
the United States within the community of nations; it would not
isolate the United States from that community, and the
extraterritorial effects of the statute similarly would be akin to
those of criminal law universal jurisdiction in civilian nations.
9 Id. at 105

70.

10 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
11 542 U.S. 692, 760 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring).
12

Id. at 762 (citing RESTATEMENT
§ 404 cmt. a (1986)).

(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES
13

Id. (citing

INT'L LAW ASS'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL

JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENCES

2 (2000)).
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KNOCKING AT THE CIVILIAN DOOR

For some time, the peculiarities of modem mass catastrophes
and increased transnational jurisdictional fluidity have brought the
American class action tort suit and the ATS increasing attention
and interest in Continental Europe. Already in 1994, a French
scholar proposed that the modern mass tort called for legal
categorization that did not yet exist. He proposed a "grand-scale
tort" (un ddlit grande 6chelle).14 Calais-Aulois would like a mass
compensation mechanism that does not require proof of criminal
intent, and where the law's focus is brought to bear on the result,
rather than the act. 15
The American class action tort suit became familiar to
Continental European lawyers and scholars with the Holocaustrelated cases brought in U.S. courts starting in the mid-1990s.
These cases involved current or former nationals or residents of
their own countries and sought multi-million dollar compensation
from their institutions and companies for misdeeds taken in
complicity with Nazi Germany. In 2006, in the Lipietz case, a
French lawyer who was precluded from pursuing a criminal
action 16 brought an action in tort law against the French
government and the Socit6 Nationale des Chemins de Fers, the
national railway company, for actions taken by both entities
against his clients, two cousins who had been persecuted under the
anti-Semitic laws of the Vichy regime (1940-1944). The underlying
acts were grave crimes against humanity. The lower court, to the
surprise of many, found for the plaintiffs, in what remains a
14 See Jean Calais-Auloy, Les ddlits t grande ichelle en droit civil franqais, 46
379, 380 (1994) (setting forth a new

REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE

form of tort characterized not by the state of mind of the actor, but by the enormity of the damage done). In a similar vein, see Claude Lienhard, Pour un droit des
catastrophes,chron., LE DALLOZ 91 (1995).
15 Calais-Auloy, supra note 14, at 386.
16 The reasons were somewhat complex, and had to do with the state the
French law when the suit originally was brought. The larger procedural context
of the case, which involved acts from over half a century in the past, concerned a
legal impossibility of damages for victims such as the plaintiffs until the French
courts reversed themselves on the issue in recent cases, the most famous of which
was Papon. For a more detailed account of this case, see Tribunal administratif
[TA] [administrative tribunal] Toulouse, 2e ch., June 6, 2006, No. 0104248 (Fr.),
available at http://lipietz.net/IMG/pdf/TaToulouseJugementLipietz.pdf.
An
English translation by Anne Witt, as revised by Vivian Grosswald Curran, is
available at The Lipietz Judgment in English, ACACCIA (July 6, 2006), http://
www.acaccia.fr/The-Judgment-Lipietz-in-English.html.
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landmark case inasmuch as the French government did not appeal
the verdict. The appellate court reversed, however. It said the case
should have been brought in criminal court, a ruling affirmed by
the Supreme Court (Conseil d'Etat).
In recent years, both Italy and Greece have allowed civil
proceedings and damages to be awarded against Germany for jus
cogens violations: massacres, torture and the like. Though, those
judgments proved unenforceable. The Brussels I Convention that
makes all judgments in civil and commercial matters applicable
automatically throughout the European Union was held by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) to be inapplicable.1 7 In accordance
with the reasoning of the German courts which had refused
enforcement, the ECJ reasoned that the underlying issues were not
of a civil nature, the judgments indeed having been based on jus
cogens violations, and, therefore, that Brussels I did not apply. In
March 2012, just days after the first (February 28, 2012) Supreme
Court oral argument in Kiobel, however, a Dutch court granted civil
damages to a Palestinian doctor for torture and imprisonment
endured in Libya under the Qaddafi regime in connection with the
Bulgarian nurses' affair. 18 On October 11, 2012, another Dutch
court decided that it had jurisdiction over Shell in a suit brought by
Nigerians for polluting the Niger Delta1 9
Such suits show the force of transnational legal communication
and the transnationalization of injuries.
Traditional legal
categories in the systems of Continental Europe, derived from
Roman law, do not, however, include the tort action where crimes
warranting universal jurisdiction are at issue.

17 See Case C-292/05, Lechitrou v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 2007 E.C.R. 1-1540.

18 Rb. Gravenhage [Court of First Instance of The Hague] 21 maart 2012 [Mar.
21, 2012], m nt. Van der Helm 400882/HA ZA 11-2252 (El Hojouj/Derbal) (Neth.).

19 See Denis Burke, Verdict Due in Case Against Shell,

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH

(Jan. 21, 2013, 6:05 PM), http://www.foei.org/en/what-wedo/climate-and-energy/latest-news/verdict-due-in-case-against-shell.
See also
Dutch Court Largely Rejects Nigerians' Case Against Shell, VOICE OF AMERICA (Jan. 30,
2013), http://www.voanews.com/content/dutch-court-largely-rejects-nigerianscase-against-shell/1593790.html.
INTERNATIONAL
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ATS UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: UNIVERSAL OR SINGULAR?

3.1. The Tort Action in the Civil Law World: A PrivateAffair
It should perhaps have been clear at the outset from the first
Kiobel oral argument that corporate liability under the ATS was not
going to be the issue of interest to the Supreme Court, although it
was the sole issue to have been appealed to the Court. Before the
plaintiffs' attorney had finished his first sentence, Justice Kennedy
interrupted to state that, for him, the case turned on whether the
United States was alone in having universal jurisdiction in civil
cases. Other justices echoed his concern. Justice Roberts asked
whether it would not in and of itself be a violation of international
law to be the only country to grant civil universal jurisdiction for
crimes against humanity.
The isolation of the United States in this respect, other than for
a few very recent cases in the Netherlands, 20 seems to be taken for
granted. One typically sees in international law books and
treatises the categorizations of criminal and civil law used to
delineate the actions for jus cogens violations that can be subject to
universal jurisdiction. The United States is then named alone for
its civil universal jurisdiction. In terms of ATS viability, however,
it is germane to see that the reasons civilians reject universal civil
jurisdiction do not apply to the United States legal system. This is
because United States tort law is functionally more equivalent to
civilian criminal law than to civilian tort law. To the question of
whether the United States is alone, the answer is that it is not
because the civil/criminal categorizations are misleading.
The traditional civilian legal system rejects the tort action for
universal jus cogens suits with good reason. Civilian tort suits are
often entirely in writing, with no live testimony. The concept of
the trial as formed in the common law system is sufficiently
different from the civilian tort action that the word trial perhaps
should be avoided when referring to the civilian tort action. If one
looks at the word used in a number of the original languages, it is
the word with the same etymology as the English word for
20 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying texts. In the most recent case, four
Nigerians sued Dutch Shell in the Netherlands for pollution damages caused by
its Nigerian subsidiary. It was the first time a Dutch court had entertained such a
suit against a multinational parent company, but in January, 2013, the court dismissed charges against all but the subsidiary.
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'process': in German Prozel, in French proc~s, in Italian processo.
The concept indeed denotes a process, a series of events, with no
concentrated oral event as its focal point. The civil trial never has a
jury in the civilian system. It is private. Nothing is in the public
domain. In some countries like France, the lawyers' submissions to
court are their own private intellectual property. While in some
countries, a computerized system makes all court decisions
available (although the manner in which the legal system functions
is such that meaningful understanding of any court decision
requires its interpretation by influential scholars), in other
countries, lower court decisions are unpublished and unavailable
even to the legal community at large. One has to request
permission of the court to read them, which may or may not be
granted, at the court's discretion.
Contingency fee arrangements of the United States sort are
deemed unethical in the civil law legal orders of Continental
Europe.
In addition to national statutes barring these
arrangements, the Code of Conduct of the Council of Bars and Law
Societies of Europe does so as well. 21 Class actions are not
permitted as they are seen as violating the principle that law must
in every case be individual. In Lipietz, the French case mentioned
above in which the lower court ruled in favor of two cousins who
had sued for wartime atrocities committed against them, after the
lower court's decision, this principle meant that thousands of
individual plaintiffs brought similar suits, flooding the system.
There was no procedure for bringing all of the suits of the similarly
situated plaintiffs to be adjudicated together. Each plaintiff had to
hire a lawyer, none on a contingency fee basis. The appellate court
decisions ended those suits. Affirming the appellate court, the
Supreme Court found that a political resolution already existed for
these cases, referring to a French compensation commission that
had been established in conjunction with a bilateral treaty
negotiated with the United States. Where no political solution has
been found, other resolutions sometimes have been fashioned. In
some cases of mass catastrophes, the government has undertaken

21 See COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUROPE, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR

EUROPEAN LAWYERS, art. 3.3 (2006) ("A lawyer shall not be entitled to make a pac-

turn de quota litis.") available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_
load/NTCdocument/EN Code of conductpl1306748215.pdf.

up-
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to compensate thousands of victims, with subsequent subrogation
rights to sue the wrongdoers in the victims' stead. 22
Without the possibility of contingency fee arrangements or
class actions, it is much harder to gain access to the civil courts.
Such a situation would be intolerable in cases of heinous crimes,
such as jus cogens violations. In addition, the lawyer in Continental
European civilian systems is more passive than in the United States
system. There is no equivalent to discovery. It is the judge who is
responsible for developing evidence. By contrast, in the United
States, the lawyer who brings the tort action on a contingency fee
basis may be motivated by the very public debate that could not
exist for a civil suit in Continental Europe. The plaintiffs would be
entitled to a jury and newspapers would be reporting on the events
that transpired each day at the concentrated oral event that is the
pivotal element of the U.S. tort trial. Where, as in ATS cases, the
allegations concerned grave crimes against humanity or other
matters of great public interest, media attention would be intense.
The public would become a participant in a societal discourse
about the case.
3.2. The CriminalAction in the Civil Law World: Functionally
Equivalent to the American Tort Action
Giving victims access to the court system, allowing them to
pursue financial compensation, and entering the public debate are
functions that the civilian criminal trial accomplishes. Like the tort
trial in the United States, criminal trials in civil law systems have a
concentrated oral phase that is covered by the media extensively
when issues of public interest are at stake. Criminal trials thus
enter the public discourse and debate of society. Unlike in the
United States, victims typically can become part of the criminal
trial in civil law legal systems. The most frequent method for
victims to join the criminal trial is as a civil party to the trial, a
partiecivile. The victim becomes a participant, able to testify and to
question the defendant. It is a role that victims' rights movement
groups have tried to achieve for trials in the United States, but

22 This was the case, among others, when HIV-contaminated blood was disseminated by a central authority to hospitals, and then to patients, creating many
thousands of victims in France. See Calais-Auloy, supra note 14, at 379 n.4 (citing
works on this subject).
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without success, as a result of United States due process concerns
for defendants.
The partie civile structure solves many of the problems for jus
cogens crimes that would exist in civil law systems if they were to
grant universal jurisdiction for jus cogens crimes in civil court
without further systemic adaptations. For one, parties civiles make
use of the State's resources in criminal trials, which means the vast
powers of investigation of the prosecutor. Since the tort trial does
not have contingency fee arrangements, victims would be put to
great personal expense in tort actions. We have noted above that
civilian lawyers are more passive than judges, in comparison to
lawyers in the United States. In some (but not all) civilian states,
prosecutors are magistrates; thus, they are trained as judges, and
they are adept at investigation.
In civil law systems, the vast powers of the civilian prosecutor
and the relatively more passive role of the lawyer are balanced by
the prosecutor's being a neutral, non-partisan figure, with the task
of pursuing exculpatory evidence as much as inculpating evidence.
Prosecutors are unelected civil servants whose professional
advancement does not hinge on accumulating large numbers of
convictions. In some countries, like France, the prosecutor can
appeal a conviction if he or she concludes, for example, that the
court imposed a stiffer sentence on the defendant than was
justified.
Equally important in assessing the ATS in the context of the
law of other nations is the twofold traditional theory in civil law
states that victims can initiate prosecutions and that prosecutors do
not have discretion to forgo prosecution if they determine a crime
to have been committed. This theory means that, like in the U.S.
tort action, the victim will have effective access to the judicial
system. The rule against prosecutorial discretion tends to be
relaxed in universal jurisdiction cases. Belgium is an example of a
country that introduced such discretion for universal jurisdiction
matters, but it has a narrower meaning than the term as used in the
United States.
The criminal trial in civilian legal orders resembles the U.S. tort
trial more than the civilian tort trial does. The reasons for
restricting universal jurisdiction to criminal actions in the civilian
systems are attributable to aspects of their tort actions that do not
exist in U.S. tort actions. Conversely, U.S. criminal law would
create some difficulties for typical victims in ATS suits inasmuch as
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prosecutors may choose not to pursue such cases, given the
uncertainties of winning.
Each system's universal jurisdiction laws seem best suited to
the goals both legal orders share of permitting victims effective
access to their judicial system and to ensuring a vigorous public
debate about important social, political, and legal issues.
4.

THE SUPRANATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The shrinking world has been bringing us together, but not
necessarily facilitating our reading each other accurately. The
European Union, however, has by now developed fora in which
jurists from both common and civil law systems have been
working together for decades, and have developed mutual
understanding.
This does not mean, of course, that when
European court decisions are interpreted in the various Member
States that they are not renationalized, that common law aspects of
a decision are not recivilianized in civil law states, and vice versa.
It, therefore, may not be surprising that it was the European
Union, unlike its individual Member States, which wrote an
amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Kiobel, supporting universal
jurisdiction under the ATS. It had no trouble understanding that
the civil courts of the United States did not signify a violation of
international law standards. It specified two provisos. The first
was that ATS universal jurisdiction be limited to those criminal
matters subject to universal jurisdiction under international law. 23
The Supreme Court already has required this limitation since Sosa,
however, giving a highly restrictive scope to acts coming within
the ATS' purview. In addition, the European Union would require
plaintiffs to exhaust local remedies to the extent that this action is
24
not futile.

23 Brief of the European Conmnission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 13-23, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 101491), available at http://www.sdshhlaw.com/pdfs/European20Commission%
20on%2OBehalf%20of %20the%2European%20Union%20%28Revised%29.pdf.
24 Brief of the European Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 30-35, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 101491), available at http://www.sdshhlaw.com/pdfs/European%20Commission%
20on%2OBehalf%20of%20the%2European%20Union%20%28Revised %29.pdf.

2013]

UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
5.

809

CONCLUSION

It is a truism that the question posed can determine the answer
that will be provided in response. The Supreme Court took the
unusual step of ordering a rehearing in Kiobel so that the issue of
extraterritoriality could be briefed and argued in the second round.
At both oral arguments it asked two questions. One of those
questions may be viewed as the wrong question and one as the
right question to ask.
As the above makes clear, the wrong question- or the question
to unravel so as to avoid the pitfall of a misleading answer that
falls into the trap of the question's formulation-was whether the
United States is alone in allowing universal civil jurisdiction for jus
cogens crimes, since, properly analyzed, the "civil" of the United
States substantively is analogous to the "criminal" of the civilian
world in the matter of universal jurisdiction. In the end, the
Supreme Court majority decided to reject extraterritoriality for the
ATS so as, among others reasons, to avoid what it believed would
be the consequence, namely "mak[ing] the United States a uniquely
hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms." 25
But underneath this question, the Court was asking the right
question for every ATS case, most international law cases, and an
increasing number of cases that United States lawyers and judges
face and will be facing on a daily basis: what is the law of other
nations?
With respect to the ATS, we cannot understand
customary international law, or the "law of nations," without
understanding foreign nations. International law is hard to sever
from the States that have formed it and from the legal orders of
those States. Foreign law matters.

25

Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668 (emphasis added).

